

The
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BOOKMAN

A Quarterly Review

Edited by Russell Kirk

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Education and the Swedish Welfare State

NILS-ERIC BRODIN

IN SWEDEN an educational system, previously admirable, is being subverted to serve ideological designs. Swedish socialists are employing public education as a tool for the perpetuation of socialist doctrine—disguised as egalitarianism, social consciousness, civic responsibility, and the like.

At a time when the American school system, belatedly, has discovered the educational bankruptcy of John Dewey's philosophy, Swedish school authorities are adopting Deweyism. Education in Sweden used to be the perpetuator of traditional cultural and educational values, founded upon the Christian faith that man was created in the image of God, and that man has spiritual power over his material condition.

But recently Sweden has commenced an educational reform which will affect progressively higher levels of learning, from primary schools to the equivalent of junior colleges, and ultimately conquer Sweden's five universities. This is a system in which the goals of education become three: (a) to make the pupil conform to modern society; (b) to make him a "free" and equal person who, freed from "authoritarian thinking and prejudice, may develop himself"; and (c) to provide preparatory training for his role in a democratic society.

These reformers aim to provide an educational system totally free from the traditional value-thinking of Western civilization. Their object is a "neutral education without one-sided political and cultural evaluations." Both candy-eating and cavities may be discussed, that is, but no directions or recommendations are to be offered. Sociology is to be taught totally without value references. Philosophy and religion are to be offered without indication of preferences. Christ, Buddha, and Bertrand Russell will be presented as equally significant in influence.

Yet there remains among the Swedish people a tenacious opposi-

tion to these radical changes. Most educated middle-class Swedes are opposed to such student-oriented and relativistic teaching. Efforts at maintaining discipline based on traditional relationships and accepted standards are undermined by the new teaching methods and the corps of new teachers in the public schools. In keeping with the socialist doctrine of equality of condition, there are no programs for gifted students. The old qualifying examinations for university entrance are being eliminated because they are allegedly anti-egalitarian and undemocratic. All this rouses much opposition.

Along with these innovations has come the elimination of most courses in religion. Even when some 2,200,000 people—half of Sweden's electorate—appealed for reintroduction of Christian instruction, they were ignored.

The new system also changes the whole system of grading. No longer can there be academic failure: accommodation must be made, so that higher grades will not imply excellence. Previously, there existed seventeen possible grades; only seven will remain. Grading must be done "on the curve," with a sample of no less than one thousand students. There will survive no true way of distinguishing "weak" grades from "strong." Regardless of academic performance, mere attendance at the new schools must be accepted as qualification for entrance into what Americans would call college.

OBVIOUSLY, these educational principles are founded on Rousseauistic conceptions, especially those expressed in *Emile*. Institutions are regarded as evil. Conventions and all moral principles are to be questioned and perhaps discarded. There must be no hierarchy of the intellect: impulses must not be checked. The results will be discerned in the quality of public instruction and, still more important, in the moral understanding of the pupils.

Erik Anners, a professor at the University of Uppsala, has described the socialist structural reforms of Swedish education as "primarily a political matter. . . . Changes have been made not so much with a view toward raising the standards of education, but rather on ideological grounds." The program is founded on "the dogmatically-based socialist endeavor to reduce everybody to a dead level."

To expedite this socialist conformity, the government has arranged to capture textbook publishing. The government encourages

student associations (compulsory at the five universities) to invest in the organization of a printing company. When this becomes too heavy a financial burden, the government promises to make loans to these student organizations, specifically for this textbook company—naturally with the proviso of government control and approval of the books published. Textbooks from this company already have been placed in circulation; and, as an article in a recent student publication points out, "surreptitious socialist propaganda is evident in government texts as in other textbooks."

THERE HAVE existed inequities in Swedish education. These have been based, often, on rather strict class-consciousness among the Swedes—especially among the working class. It is significant that in 1959, some 6 per cent of Social Group I (the upper classes) provided no less than 60 per cent of the upper-division university students. Although Swedish education is "free" at the five state universities (and there exist no private or church-related institutions of higher learning), students have come mainly from the upper and middle classes. This imbalance is due more to the higher motivation and cultural background of the homes of those classes, than to economic conditions. The government provides inexpensive student housing, interest-free loans, educational grants, and even a "student wage," in order to encourage the working classes to obtain higher education.

In their zeal for equality, the socialists have uprooted the traditional system of education, which provided for different kinds of instruction, from classical studies to vocational training, depending on individual desires and aptitudes. Having adopted a kind of snobism in reverse, the socialists argue that everyone is entitled—nay, ought—to have the same sort of education.

Therefore the government neglects no level of schooling in its doctrinaire reform, from kindergarten to university. It already has affected teacher-selection, curricula, methods; it has done away with matriculation examinations, lowered entrance-requirements for universities, closed almost all private and denominational schools, centralized school authority, and even discontinued the students' white caps, in deference to social egalitarianism. In short, the government has made public education into a partisan instrument.

The implications of these reforms may be discerned easily. With

what Dr. Annars calls "a doctrinaire policy of leveling," the socialists wish to democratize the school, setting student and teacher on the same plane. The student is paid a wage, for instance, so that he will feel equal to the teacher. Physical disciplining is forbidden, and even verbal chastisement is regarded as "offensive to the pupil's pride." Platform or rostrum is eliminated, as implying inequality between student and teacher. It is significant that the students' central organization recently praised all this as a "student democracy existing in a very few countries, among which are Scandinavia and Cuba." It is no accident that there are pictures of Castro, Guevara, and Mao on the sweatshirts of these student zealots. The United States' educational system, on the other hand, is regarded by them as "teacher authoritarianism, where a radical reform by the student councils, in regard to pedagogical questions, is hard to imagine."

NOW THAT "good citizenship" (that is, adherence to socialistic principles) and "social adjustment" have become characteristic of Swedish education, quality has been radically lowered. In a study a year ago, Sweden stood lowest in the scale of mathematical proficiency among thirteen-year-old students from twelve countries, for instance. The purpose of these reforms is to sacrifice knowledge for "personality adjustment," and the creation of favorable social attitudes, which should build bridges between classes in society.

Such goals, nevertheless, have not been achieved. These "new schools" are afflicted by severe social problems, never previously experienced in the Swedish educational structure. The schools suffer from violence against teachers, vandalism, drug-addiction, drinking, and other unpleasant forms of social behavior. Among the higher classes, there is much absenteeism. The socialists' eagerness for educational reform directed to partisan ends has brought the blackboard jungle into the Swedish schoolhouse.

Russian Power in Asia

CENTRAL ASIA: A CENTURY OF RUSSIAN RULE, edited by Edward Allworth. New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1967. 549 pp.

Reviewed by Robert G. Neumann

THIS SCHOLARLY and highly interesting volume endeavors to combine a detailed historical analysis with an economic, sociological, ethno-linguistic, literary, and musicological treatment—thus giving, between the covers of one single book, an amazingly complete picture of the period. It is a very successful endeavor.

The historical chapters are primarily the work of the editor, Professor Edward Allworth of Columbia, and of Hélène Carrère d'Encausse of the National Foundation of Political Science in Paris. In the initial chapter, entitled "Encounter," Prof. Allworth sets the stage by demonstrating that formal contacts between the Russian Christians and Central Asian Moslems date back to 986 A.D. but became an issue only after the Russian conquest of Tashkent in 1865. Christianity was one of the instruments of Russian expansion into Central Asia but the demands of Russian merchants who claimed and often suffered discrimination were at least as important a driving force. However, after 1800 the real or pretended persecution of Christians (Russians) by "heathens" (Moslems) became an increasingly burning issue among the Russian people.

The Russians identified Khokand, Khiva, and Bukhara as their principal adversaries, but had the greatest respect for Bukhara even though it was not the largest of the three. At first ignorance, insufficient preparation, and underestimation of the enemy caused several Russian disasters, but from 1846 on the management of Russian affairs in Asia passed increasingly into military hands. The result was a series of setbacks for the Asians, culminating in the conquest of Tashkent in 1865. Although Tashkent was neither the first nor the last nor perhaps the most important of the Russian conquests in Asia, it became a symbol for Russian aspirations. From 1865 till 1884 we see a systematic policy of Russian conquest. This period also produced a number of interesting and strong Russian military

governors, among whom the personality of General K. P. von Kaufman was perhaps the most interesting.

This period of steady Russian expansion and conquest aroused the suspicion of the British. Seemingly inevitable conflict was avoided in 1887, when Afghanistan was tacitly recognized as a buffer state belonging essentially in the British zone of influence and when the Amu Darya (Oxus) was delimited as the northern frontier of Afghanistan. This agreement was completed in 1895 when the Pamir frontier between Russia and Afghanistan was fixed. This added further territory to Russia, but also, permanently it would seem, prevented Russia from gaining a common border with India by creating the Wakhan corridor of Afghanistan between them.

THERE WAS a widespread impression that Russia's expansion into Central Asia was primarily inspired by economic motives. But Professor Allworth counters this thesis by quoting Ignatiev, Russian military attaché in London, who wrote as early as 1858, "In the case of conflict with England it is only in Asia that we shall be able to struggle with her with any chances for success and to weaken her."

Tsarist Russia's stewardship of its Central Asian provinces was far from trouble-free. Governors who had some understanding of Asian mentality were often accused of being too "soft" and were replaced by harder taskmasters. In any case, the Russian rulers regarded themselves as enlightened bearers of civilization into backward territory. But even where that was true, trouble ensued, as for instance when the Russians attempted to fight locusts and epidemics only to be confronted by people who "dreaded more offending God by destroying His creatures" than they dreaded the famine which the locusts brought.

When the Russian Revolution of 1917 broke out, its very existence encouraged autonomist movements in the "colonial" territories of Asia. However, once the Soviet regime was installed it regarded these nationalist movements in Asia as counterrevolutionary. After initial serious setbacks in Bukhara and the Transcaspian Republic, and the encouragement to the nationalist movements by the British Expeditionary Forces, the triumphant Bolsheviks were able to crush the nationalists and to set up the undisputed control of the "Great Russians" who ruled the Communist parties in the Asian provinces. When the Moslems demanded that in these colonial environments,

where no conscious and organized proletariat existed, priority should be given to the nationality struggle rather than to social liberation, the Comintern, through G. E. Zinoviev, Béla Kun, Karl Radek, and M. Pavlovich, replied that the struggle for social liberation had priority. At the same time Frunze emphasized that concessions to the Moslems would encourage anti-Soviet nationalist movements and won Lenin over to his argument. Sanctions and purges soon followed.

However, nationalism was not so easily defeated. Especially in Bukhara it saw a brief period of success. In 1920 the Soviet regime had to accept the nationalist Young Bukharans, but between 1921 and 1923 the situation finally changed. Foreign intervention was repulsed and the position of the Soviet regime became stronger. Elsewhere in Europe the Revolution failed and it became clear to the Soviets that national unity had to be achieved in order to consolidate the USSR. Deviant regimes therefore could not be tolerated, but success was to be achieved by political means, not by military intervention.

Thus, after 1923, the National Republics lost whatever independence they had acquired. But the conflict was not quickly over. During the collectivization drive of 1930-36 nationalist movements like those of the Basmachi saw a rebirth, and it was not until 1938 that their leaders were executed after show trials. Only then was the movement finally crushed and some of its leaders went into exile in neighboring Afghanistan.

DEVELOPMENTS in Central Asia from 1924 to 1934 could therefore be divided into two overlapping periods. From 1924 to 1928 the nationalist leaders tried to salvage what autonomy they could within the framework of the republic governments. After 1928 they were impelled to oppose collectivization and other economic measures in order to preserve the autonomy of those regions which finally resulted in the liquidation of the national elites.

Only in southern Central Asia was the story somewhat different. Russian colonization had been less advanced there and the number of non-Moslems remains relatively low. Thus the local Moslem elites were able to survive the purges, though often at the price of "spectacular abjurations," and were thus able to build a bridge between the leadership which was liquidated in 1937-38 and a

younger Moslem generation. Thus, concludes Hélène Carrère d'Encausse, "after a century of close contact with Russia, southern Central Asia seems to be the last and most secure refuge of the active sense on nationality among the former Muslim people of the USSR."

Strong Essays on Burke

EDMUND BURKE, THE ENLIGHTENMENT AND THE MODERN WORLD, edited by Peter J. Stanlis. Detroit: University of Detroit Press, 1967. 129 pp.

Reviewed by Francis Canavan, S.J.

PUTTING A TITLE on a collection of disparate papers is always a problem. Considering the difficulty, the editor of this volume has succeeded rather well. The five papers and two commentaries that make it up were originally read at a Burke symposium at the University of Detroit in November 1965. The papers do not really hang together, but at least a fair part of them can be grouped under the symposium's stated theme: "Edmund Burke, the Enlightenment and the Modern World."

The first paper fits the theme only by having Edmund Burke as its subject. Written by Thomas H. D. Mahoney, it is a carefully detailed account of Burke's part in the repeal of the Stamp Act, an episode in which Burke's "meteoric rise from political obscurity to national prominence" (as Prof. Mahoney calls it) coincided with the first act of the drama of the American Revolution. Prof. Mahoney is an historian and a good one. The work he does here is characterized by the same excellence as his earlier writing on Burke and will be useful to all students of a man in whom political thought was so closely linked with political action. A commentary on this paper, by Daniel L. McCue Jr., is brief but deserves praise for bringing out the case that can be made for Burke's opponents in the Stamp Act controversy.

The union of thought and action in Burke is also the theme of the second paper, Robert A. Smith's "Burke's Crusade against the French Revolution: Principles and Prejudices." As its title indi-

cates, this paper is squarely focused on one aspect of Burke's relationship to the Enlightenment, i.e., his thorough repudiation of the French Revolution. But Prof. Smith's point is that Burke's quarrel with the Revolution cannot be understood as a clash of principles alone. Burke, he says, was a man of his time, whose reaction to the Revolution was inspired not only by his intellectual convictions, but also by other "essentially personal and momentary themes."

Prof. Smith seems to accept, though he does not quote, John Morley's dictum that Burke "changed his front, but he never changed his ground." Smith says: "There can no longer be any reasonable doubt that there is a fundamental intellectual consistency within and behind the superficial diversity of Burke's ideas and writings. The same basic principles and assumptions can be found everywhere from the earliest letters and pamphlets to the last." None the less, he says—and this is the burden of his paper—one does find shifts of emphasis in Burke's thought and a varying "application of some of these fundamental principles to the judgment of specific political events . . . between his earlier writings and those of the Revolutionary period."

THUS the early Burke had more faith in the wisdom of the people than the Burke of the 1790's. This change of attitude was due not merely to the French revelation of what the people were capable of doing, but also to Burke's discovery over the years that the British people were not natural and dependable supporters of the Rockingham Whigs. Again, Burke's distrust of radicalism in religion and politics was consistent throughout his life, but it sprang from his attachment to a transient political and social order as well as from his deeper beliefs. One consequence was that Burke looked upon movements for constitutional reform simply as the expression of false and dangerous ideas, ignoring the extent to which they manifested the needs of a changing society.

Personal considerations also shaped Burke's attitudes as time went by. Many of the reformers and interest groups who had been Burke's political allies eventually revealed themselves as "the avowed enemies of everything in which he believed most passionately." Not only that; he became convinced that they were trying to drive him out of public life. Burke's growing disaffection from men whom he had trusted and esteemed goes part way to explain

the vehemence of his attacks on radicals in the Revolutionary period.

Prof. Smith's paper is a reminder to students of Burke's political thought that he was not a detached intellect, but very much a political partisan. If one can imagine a highly intelligent and reflective U.S. senator, one might expect to find a political philosophy in his speeches and writings. But it would be astonishing if they did not bear the traces, after their author had spent nearly thirty years in Congress, of outdated controversies, shifting political alliances, and personal bias and rancor. So, too, with Burke: he was not exempt from the common weaknesses of political men.

Harvey C. Mansfield Jr.'s "Burke and Machiavelli on Principles in Politics" is brilliant, intriguing, but not entirely convincing, at least to this reviewer. Written in the style of Leo Strauss, it seems clearly to reflect the master's well-known interpretations of Burke and Machiavelli. To say this is not to detract from the paper's considerable merits: there are far worse starting points in political philosophy than the works of Leo Strauss.

At the risk of oversimplifying a subtle piece of analysis, let us say that the paper's basic premise is this: "A political principle is or implies a universal assertion about the common good which excludes other universal assertions." A principle of this kind would be a conception of the good life for man and society such as one finds in the classic writings of antiquity or in Christian revelation; and it makes party government as practiced in today's liberal democracies impossible, because party government assumes a plurality of principles, all of them legitimate.

According to Dr. Mansfield, Machiavelli was the first to have asserted that party government is good, on the ground that the competition of several principles in a state is the source of its freedom and its power. "But," says Mansfield, "by allowing such competition, he seems to have blasted all principles from politics." For Machiavelli, a party cannot be founded on a principle which is a conception of the good of the whole community; politics is only the clash of interests, of which the common good may be a by-product.

Burke asserted, according to Mansfield, that parties were not only good but respectable. But he sought to maintain that "it is possible to practice several principles without abandoning all

principles." This he did by yielding a point to Machiavelli and accepting an "impartial" natural law which "contains no *summum bonum* and recommends no particular end or way of life." Rather, the end of the state is "a noble and liberal liberty" that enables men to "live securely, actively and as virtuously as they will."

At the very end of his paper, however, Mansfield says that on certain decisive occasions Burke had to recur to principles higher than those of his "prescriptive, impartial natural law [which] does not include the highest good of man and hence . . . does not permit an appeal to principles above politics." It is not clear to Mansfield "whether the source of transcendent principles for Burke was the classical good life or the Christian conscience or both." There he leaves the matter. There, too, since lack of space forbids criticism, we must leave the matter, with but one remark: this paper may be wrong about Machiavelli or Burke or both, but it is a penetrating critique of liberal democracy.

THE EDITOR of this volume, Peter J. Stanlis, has contributed a valuable essay entitled "Edmund Burke and the Scientific Rationalism of the Enlightenment." He finds the essence of this rationalism in a "faith in reason as an absolute, sufficient unto itself"; and the most perfect product of this reason is geometry. The rationalist faith of the Enlightenment thus included "the conviction that an exact science of human nature, and therefore of ethics and politics, was possible, if only men applied the infallible methods of deductive logic and analytical geometry to human affairs."

It was against this conception of reason that Burke revolted all his life. But in this he was only continuing what Prof. Stanlis calls "a rich tradition of philosophical skepticism toward speculative theory based on scientific rationalism," of which Dryden, Swift, and Johnson were the best representatives. They did not reject reason itself, but they had "a profound awareness of the limits of human reason as the supreme instrument for establishing 'truth,' especially in religion." Prof. Stanlis shows without difficulty that Burke stood in this tradition. His paper has the additional merit of defining clearly what it was in the Enlightenment to which Burke and his predecessors most strongly objected.

A brief paper by the late Walter D. Love, "'Meaning' in the History of Conflicting Interpretations of Burke," concludes the

volume. Dr. Love urges study of the history of the interpretations of Burke. As we know, explanations of what Burke meant have varied widely, and some of the explanations have contradicted Burke's own explicit statements. Yet the commentators had all read Burke, and they were not stupid men. Dr. Love suggests that it would throw light on the history of thought if scholars today were to ask, not only what Burke really meant, but also why so many intelligent people thought he meant something different.

The ultimate value of this kind of inquiry might be a better understanding of Burke. But Love sees it as useful also because of what it would tell us about the men who have interpreted Burke and about the intellectual preoccupations of the periods in which they wrote. It might even lead to some conclusions about the ways in which ideas are transmitted and transformed from generation to generation.

This book, one sees, is a somewhat mixed bag of papers. But they are all good, and all give evidence of the growing depth and sophistication of scholarship on Burke and his time. Dr. Stanlis, the editor, deserves particular praise for the stimulus and encouragement he has given this scholarship in the past ten years and more. The present volume is but one more testimony of his efforts.

Native Differences in Intelligence?

THE TESTING OF NEGRO INTELLIGENCE (2nd. ed.), by Audrey W. Shuey.

New York: Social Science Press, 1966.

Reviewed by **Wallace A. Kennedy**

THE SECOND EDITION of Dr. Shuey's definitive work reviewing the assessment of Negro intelligence follows closely the plan of the 1958 edition, with an additional 140 studies, of which 29 are unpublished Master's theses and 25 are unpublished doctoral dissertations covering the period 1921-1965, and an additional chapter on "Veterans and Other Civilians." Both Garrett, in his Foreword, and Shuey, in her conclusions, agree that the results of these 380 studies, including 90 unpublished theses and 35 unpublished dissertations, "inevitably point to the presence of native differences between Negroes and whites as determined by intelligence tests."

An extremely detailed, careful book, the review includes studies covering a period of approximately fifty years and 11,120 Negro adults examined in jails, prisons, reformatories, psychiatric clinics, shelters for homeless men, etc.; 81,000 Negro children; 48,200 Negro high school and college students, and Negro men tested in the armed services. Geographically the sample represents all the southern states and many border, northern, and western states. Eighty psychometric tests are represented.

Dr. Shuey organized her book into categories—young children, school children, high school and college students, the armed forces, veterans and other civilians, deviates, delinquents and criminals, racial hybrids, and selective migration—and reviewed and commented on the appropriate studies, or the appropriate parts of studies, in each chapter, where she provided a careful table of all the studies cited, listing the authors and date, location of the study, number in the sample, age, and grade of subjects, method of sample selection, results, and author's comments. In each table each study is listed under the psychometric test used. The focal point of the book is the discrepancy between white and Negro IQ means.

Certainly the book establishes the fact, beyond any argument, that, taken as a whole, Negroes score significantly lower than whites on standard intelligence instruments, and most reviewers who have been critical of this point in Dr. Shuey's earlier book, by citing studies not included and quibbling over interpretation of studies, have made a poor rebuttal indeed. There is, however, one aspect of the text which has drawn considerable reaction on the part of serious investigators of minority groups. This is, by comparison, a very small aspect of Dr. Shuey's massive volume, but nevertheless, it is a crucial one. This thesis is expressed most clearly in her concluding remarks, when, after summarizing all of the categories of comparison in which Negro children are found inferior to white children on intelligence measures, she concludes that all of this evidence points to "the presence of native differences between Negroes and whites as determined by intelligence tests." It is this concept of "native differences," and its implication, that has drawn the severest criticism, much of it without empirical support, of Dr. Shuey's work.

THE MAJOR weaknesses in the research evidence presented by Shuey are the lack of representativeness of the samples in the studies cited and, of course, the great differences in definition of intelligence which occurred as a result of the use of many different intelligence tests, as well as the fact that Shuey gives equal emphasis to studies both published and unpublished, and using both large numbers of subjects and extremely small numbers of subjects. In commenting upon studies which lead toward an environmental point of view, Dr. Shuey tends to discredit the authors' reasoning or cast doubt upon the correctness of their conclusions. For example, in reviewing the work of Klaus and Gray, she reports that the experimental groups in the Headstart-like summer sessions showed IQ gains, but she is not satisfied that the methods used warrant any conclusions that changing the environment can change the IQ. She argues with Deutsch and Brown's conclusions of a cumulative deficit hypothesis by stating that "the authors are as much in error in their concluding statement as they would be if they had observed instead that their data showed that the intelligence of the parents represented a possible hereditary modifier of intelligence test performance of the children."

In reviewing Kennedy, Van De Riet, and White's normative study

of 1,800 Negro elementary school children in the Southeast, she pulls the 19 Negro five-year-olds who were in the first grade and reviews that portion of the study in her chapter on young children. These 19 children were the only children in the first grade in a table representing 1,910 Negro preschool children and 12,834 white preschool children. Of the total children represented in the table, 1,041 Negro and 12,346 white children were in kindergarten, 26 Negro and 26 white children in nursery school. It was pointed out that in this study the mean IQ of the Negro children was negatively correlated with age, but it was not mentioned that this was an artifact of the sampling procedure of randomly representing grade level rather than age level.

AS A HANDBOOK for serious researchers of the problem of assessment of Negro intelligence, Dr. Shuey's book is a must. She has missed no studies of any consequence in the fifty years covered by the book, and a criticism of over-inclusion is a trivial criticism indeed in a book such as this. Her conclusions, though unpopular, represent a view that is shared by some very distinguished company. So long as one sticks to an operational definition of intelligence, it is a view with considerable support.

Thus Dr. Shuey's conclusions regarding the empirical evidence of the poor showing of Negroes on intelligence tests are inescapable, and it is only in the area of theoretical interpretation that there is cause for serious disagreement among scholars. The greater similarity between Negro and white children at the preschool level, the significant differences between socio-economic groups even within races, and the evidence amassing through the Collaborative Child Development Project and Bayley's work of no significant differences between races in infant intelligence, along with Pasa-manick's suggested effects of prenatal influences, all tend to support the interpretation that the definitive study on the effects of environment has not yet been conducted. Until it can be demonstrated empirically that environment plays no part in the differences exhibited by Negro and white intelligence test performance, positive conclusions that the differences are "native" are, in fact, premature.

Canons of Social Science

THEORY AND METHODS OF SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH, by Johan Galtung. Oslo, Universitetsforlaget; London, Allen and Unwin; New York, Columbia University Press, 1967. 534 pp.

Reviewed by **Joseph Dunner**

THE TITLE of this comprehensive volume expresses optimistically an advocacy, rather than an existing fact. By addressing himself to the "theory and methods of social research," the author has committed himself to the necessity and plausibility of a social science. Indeed, the opening chapter firmly deplores the academic atomism of social research, and its division into separate and (in many cases) self-contained fields of endeavor.

Although the idea of bringing together disciplines like sociology, economics, psychology, and political science is not novel, Galtung has added importantly to this unification what many contemporary empiricists neglect—that is, the discipline of history. All of these fields belong together for two major reasons: first, they are all concerned with the human being as their unit of analysis; second, in their different emphases upon time and space variables of human relations, they necessarily require one another for a comprehensive grasp of human existence. In compiling this work, therefore, Galtung obviously has sought to organize his material around a conceptualized, unified social science, rather than any particular field.

He admits that his book is not intended for specialists whose particular questions and concerns might lead them beyond the basic groundwork of social research. But if the book is not meant for specialists, it is not written for the beginner, either. This book assumes the sort of training which an advanced graduate student in the social sciences is supposed to possess. The question remains whether or not this restriction to what one might call the middle-range reader does not severely handicap the use of the book.

The book's organization has real merit, for it seeks to capture the dynamics of research. Rather than setting forth chapter-wise specific approaches, as is often done in books about research-methods, Galtung has divided his volume into two major parts: Data Collec-

tion and Data Analysis. In this way, he is able to take the reader step by step through the entire research process. Of particular use to those social scientists who work in mathematically-oriented empirical research are the construction of five types of models most frequently used by social researchers, and Galtung's discussion of variable analysis.

IN THE contemporary preoccupation with methods and methodology, social scientists have tended to become entangled in a curious methodological sophism, leading them frequently to overlook the very social problem, and instead to stress their tool of analysis. Overemphasis on methodological subtleties and fear of personal involvement has combined to prevent many social scientists from concerning themselves with the major socio-political problems of our time; and thereby has produced a social science of the obvious.

Galtung, however, rightly stresses that as society is a dynamic unit, so must be the methods by which the social scientist comes to understand his human environment. Methods are devised not to restrict the scientist, but to help him. Hence, those who chastise scientific "intuition" or "insight" as unscientific because it does not conform to accepted methods, actually do much to destroy the vitality of a growing social science. Along with such methodological restrictions, Galtung includes the "value-free" requirement of many of our contemporary social scientists.

To be "value-free" does not necessarily make an analysis scientific. To achieve this neutrality, the social scientist must limit the scope and nature of his research. He cannot enter, for example, into controversial social issues, but can treat them only after they have become *faits accomplis*. Thus the scientists' "value-neutrality" will substantiate, in effect, the victorious social forces—the *status quo*, which, as chances may have it, may be for the better or the worse. By contrast, Galtung calls for the committed social scientist, one who is not the propagandist and ideological distorter, but an active and interested participant in the society he analyzes. Only in this way, it may be said, can knowledge contribute to social growth—and not merely to the growth of social-science research methods. The author disclaims those who insist that a scientist must not concern himself with areas in which he has personal feelings. On the contrary, the "biases" in studies made by the clearly committed

scientist normally are by far more honest and visible than the hidden biases which pass under the heading of "value-neutrality."

Galtung's book is written without the usual jargon and word-invention so dear to many methodologists of our time. An appendix is provided with some definitions on data-processing, and sample sheets are illustrated for such processing. It is regrettable only that this valuable reference work has not been edited with greater care. Apart from various printing errors, it suffers from deficiencies in the use of the English language. Still, this reviewer recommends Galtung's book very highly.

Books of Interest

(The following recent books, of some interest to readers of this quarterly, can be described only briefly here; but some may be reviewed at greater length in later issues.)

American Government and Politics: a Reader, edited by William J. Moore, Walter C. Schuiling, Aram M. Sogomonian, and George K. Zaharopoulos (American Book Company, 385 pp., paperbound, \$2.75). An anthology for undergraduate use, better balanced and more lively than many in its field.

America Now, edited by John G. Kirk (Atheneum, 357 pp., \$7.50). Some twenty-two essays on the present condition and prospects of these United States, with contributions by writers as varied as Kenneth Boulding, Henry Steele Commager, George Gallup, T. George Harris, Russell Kirk, Robert MacIver, George McGovern, Floyd McKissick, Richard Rovere, and Frank Trager. Most of the articles are refreshingly free from meliorism.

Flannery O'Connor, a Critical Essay, by Robert Drake (Eerdmans [Contemporary Writers in Christian Perspective series], 48 pp., \$0.85). A perceptive brief study of one of the more talented and honest novelists of our time. Other slim volumes in this paper-bound series have to do with Charles Williams, T. S. Eliot, Ernest Hemingway, Peter DeVries, and John Updike.

The Guidance Function in Education, by Percival W. Hutson (Appleton-Century-Crofts, second edition, 786 pp., \$9.50). Standard textbook in the growing field of school and college "guidance."

Historical Consciousness, or the Remembered Past, by John Lukacs (Harper & Row, 373 pp., \$7.95). Reflections on what the study of history is all about, by an able disciple of Tocqueville.

Introduction to Politics: Essays and Readings, edited by Nelson P. Guild and Kenneth T. Palmer (John Wiley and Sons, 341 pp., paperbound, \$2.25). An anthology of essays on twentieth-century political questions, for use in the basic political-science course in colleges. Contributions by Robert A. Dahl, Louis M. Hacker, Max Lerner, Samuel Huntington, Gabriel Almond, Seymour Martin Lipset, Russell Kirk, Frank J. Sorauf, etc.

Social Welfare: Principles and Concepts, by Edmund Arthur Smith (Association Press, 478 pp., \$9.00). A prize-winning study of first principles in this field.

Studies in Modern History, edited by Gaetano L. Vincitorio (St. John's University Press, New York, 382 pp., \$9.50). Members of the faculty of St. John's University contribute thirteen essays on a wide variety of subjects in "Contemporary History," "American History," and "European History." Professor Borisz de Balla's "Pages from a Diplomatic Diary, 1939-1946" is especially interesting. Several of the contributors have studied under Professor Ross J. S. Hoffman, of Fordham. A very creditable collection.

Traveller Extraordinary: the Life of James Bruce of Kinnaird, by J. M. Reid (Norton, 320 pp., \$6.95). An accurate and very readable biography of the eighteenth-century explorer of Abyssinia, whose own memoirs in many volumes have long been unavailable. The current passion for African studies in school and college needs enlightenment by such books as this, unless such courses are to degenerate into mere fantasy and ideology. The civilization of the Ethiopian empire—encountered by Bruce in its decadence—is the only native African culture, except of course for Egypt's, which developed a long continuity, a body of literature, and an enduring political structure. Out of Africa, indeed, come all things strange; and Bruce was disbelieved by Samuel Johnson and many

others. Although this Scots laird did not really discover the true source of the Nile, in nearly every other respect Bruce was a trustworthy and perceptive observer. Mr. Reid has drawn upon the Bruce papers preserved by the Earl of Elgin at Broomhall, in Fife, previously little consulted.

Urban Political Systems: A Functional Analysis of Metro Toronto, by Harold Kaplan (Columbia University Press, 320 pp., \$8.50). Examination of the first North American undertaking in metropolitan federation, which commenced in 1953.

Biddle's Bank: the Crucial Years, by Jean Alexander Wilburn (Columbia University Press, 149 pp., \$6.50). An interesting analysis of the support for, and opposition to, the Second Bank of the United States, during the age of Jackson; the author's thesis runs counter to most previous judgments.

Ombudsmen for American Government?, edited by Stanley V. Anderson (Prentice-Hall, 181 pp., paperbound, \$1.95). Five informative essays on proposals for the office of ombudsman, or agent of justice for complaints against actions of state officials.

Religion and Public Education, edited by Theodore R.Sizer (Houghton Mifflin, 361 pp., paperbound, \$2.95). Seventeen essays, representing a wide range of opinions, on the problems raised by court decisions and other recent developments concerning religious teaching in public schools. Among the contributors are Samuel Miller, Harvey Cox, Father Neil McCluskey, and Talcott Parsons. A contribution by William B. Ball, "The Post-Schempp Years," is especially interesting.

W. B. Yeats, Man and Poet, by Norman Jeffares (Barnes & Noble, 365 pp., paperbound, \$2.50). A useful paperback printing of the second edition (1961) of this study.

Notes on Contributors

Mr. Nils-Eric Brodin, a Swede who has pursued graduate studies in the United States for several years, recently has published articles on Swedish society in several journals. He is now with the Hoover Institution, at Stanford.

Dr. Robert G. Neumann, at present United States ambassador to Afghanistan, has been director of the Institute of International and Foreign Studies at the University of California at Los Angeles for nearly a decade. He has been the recipient of numerous international awards and decorations.

The Reverend Francis Canavan, S.J. is professor of political science at Fordham University, and the author of *The Political Reason of Edmund Burke*.

Dr. Wallace A. Kennedy is director of the Human Development Clinic at Florida State University, and professor of psychology at that institution. He is the author of a well-known monograph on the intelligence and achievement of 1,800 Negro elementary students in five southeastern states.

Dr. Joseph Dunner, the editor of *Dictionary of Political Science and Handbook of World History: Concepts and Issues*, is David Petegorsky Professor of Political Science at Yeshiva University.



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